The finding that mental imagery is associated with activity in primary visual cortex has important implications for sensory processing in the brain.
Can you easily form mental pictures from the descriptions of scenery that are so frequently met with in novels and books of travel? More than 100 years ago Francis Galton [1] sent out a list of questions, including this one, to gather statistics on the character of mental imagery. Many people reported vivid mental imagery, but not the scientists on his list. "To my astonishment", Galton reported, "I found that the great majority of the men of science to whom I first applied protested that mental imagery was unknown to them". This response, which Galton attributed to a "mental deficiency", might more kindly be attributed to excessive scrupulosity. Scientists like to be exact in their usage, and, judging by one of the responses Galton prints, these eminent fellows may have considered that examining a visual mental image was not the same as inspecting a painting: a mental image has a more sketchy character, and should be thought of more as a symbolic description.
Whatever the explanation for Galton's curious postbag from his colleagues, the question of whether visual imagery is pictorial or symbolic is one that has long interested philosophers and scientists, and has given rise to what is called the 'imagery debate' [2, 3] . With the advent of brain scanning techniques, it has become possible to sharpen some of the questions underlying this debate; in particular, one can ask whether the parts of the brain active in visual imagery are those that represent visual events in a 'pictorial' manner.
As I shall describe shortly, the areas in the cortex that belong to an early stage of the visual pathway are laid out in topographic correspondence with the retina, and can therefore be thought of as representing a sort of picture of the visual input, whereas later areas appear to represent visual data more symbolically. Several groups have shown that visual imagery produces activity in regions corresponding to these early topographically mapped areas. Recently, Kosslyn et al. [4] have carried this further and produced direct evidence for topographic mapping of visual imagery: if an object that extends over a wide area of visual field is imagined, the activity in these early areas extends more widely than if the imagined object subtends a more limited visual angle. This is a dramatic result, and gives strong impetus to the pictorialist view. I shall consider some of its implications here.
Some of the cortical regions involved in visual processing are shown in Figure 1 , beginning with the first of the cortical visual areas, V1. As has been known since Hubel and Wiesel's famous work [5] , many of the neurons in V1 respond to edges, that is, to boundaries between regions of different brightness. If a small part of the retina is stimulated with a bar of light, the activity in V1 will be localized to a small region, and as the bar is moved around the activity in V1 shifts, thereby mapping out a correspondence between the retina and V1.
One could reasonably argue that V1 carries a pictorial representation of the visual sensory data; a visual image creates a pattern of activity in V1 which could be viewed as a sort of cartoon illustration (Fig. 1 ). But there is also an element of symbolic encoding in V1, because neurons signal other information besides the retinal location of the stimulus; they may respond to a particular direction of motion, for example, or to stereoscopic depth, or colour. As one progresses through visual areas [6, 7] , the map by retinal position gets more imprecise and the neural encoding more complex [8] , until, in the inferotemporal cortex (IT), neurons seem to be concerned with object recognition, and any identifiable topographic order seems to relate to abstract properties of the image rather than retinal location.
To locate the brain activity underlying visual imagery, Kosslyn et al. [4] used positron emission tomography (PET) to determine regional blood flow (a measure of local neuronal activity) when subjects performed an imagery task. The subjects were given a set of pictures to memorize, and were then asked to form a mental image of one of these pictures and to answer a simple question about it, such as "is the extreme right-hand point of the image higher than the extreme left-hand point?" They were also asked to visualise the image at one of three sizes, having previously been shown cardboard squares subtending ¼, 4 or 16 degrees of visual angle. While engaged in this task, the subjects inhaled 15 Olabelled CO 2 . A larger amount of labelled compound accumulates in regions of high blood flow, and these regions can then be pinpointed, to a resolution of about 0.5 cm, by gamma rays released by the decay of the radioactive oxygen. As the difference in position between points of V1 that correspond to the fovea and the periphery of the visual field is some 3-4 cm, this resolution would be sufficient to detect the difference in extent between the different-sized mental images, assuming that they were mapped onto the cortex in the same fashion as retinal images. Kosslyn et al. [4] reported that the mental images induced activity in many cortical areas, including early, retinally mapped areas. In particular, the differently sized mental images produced activity in V1 that was in accord with that area's retinal mapping, lying in the region closest to the back of the head for small images, and extending further forward for larger images.
Other groups besides Kosslyn's have investigated the question of whether imagery can induce activity in V1, and there have been opposing claims (see, for example [9, 10] ). What make the new results particularly convincing are, firstly, the use of a new type of control condition which seems to provide a more reliable baseline for measuring activity in V1 against, and secondly, the direct evidence for retinal mapping.
How might imagery-induced brain activity in early visual areas be generated? Visual memory for objects is thought to reside in the higher cortical regions, such as IT, that lie at the end of the processing chain. It is a reasonable supposition that the act of recollecting a memorized image should activate IT, and a supporter of the symbolic side of the imagery debate might well have expected the activity to have been confined to IT and other higher cortical regions. That it is not points the finger of suspicion at a feature of cortical areas that I have not mentioned yet: for every connection between cortical areas that goes forward in the processing stream, there is one going back [7] . It is striking that the feedback pathways are often as large as the feedforward ones in numbers of axons. It is tempting, therefore, to think that the feedback pathways might be involved in mental imagery.
At this point is it helpful to ask about the relationship of imagery to normal vision. There is evidence [3, 11] that imagery can assist perception by creating expectations Dispatch 509
Figure 1
At the top left, a few of the visual areas in the cortex of the macaque are shown, as arranged in the brain and more schematically, with arrows representing the flow of neural information. V1 is the primary visual cortex; V2 to V5 specialize in aspects of the image, like motion (V5) and colour (V4) [6] ; VP is the ventral posterior area; VOT is the ventral occipitotemporal area; and IT is the inferotemporal cortex. For every arrow in the feedforward direction (from V1 to IT), there is one in the reverse direction; this causes no confusion about the direction of processing, because the anatomy of the two types of connection is distinct [7] . In the lower half of the figure are sketched the activity patterns that might be expected in primary visual cortex (V1, left) and inferotemporal cortex (IT, right) in response to an image (upper right: Albrecht Dürer's Great Triumphal Car, featuring what is perhaps one of the earliest instances of a thought bubble). Also indicated, at the bottom, are the types of visual stimulus contained in the image that would be expected to activate neurons, these being edges in V1 [5] and more complex features in IT [8] , such as a neuron specific for an eye (left) and one specific for a hand (right). Note that the activity in V1 amounts to a sort of cartoon of the image, whereas that in IT represents the image symbolically, with no relationship between the location in the cortex of a neuron and the position of the stimulus it responds to. 
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--IT about the incoming visual stimuli; for example, imagery can indicate where parts of a figure might be expected to lie when the figure is partly obscured. Might the mechanism that does this operate not only in conscious mode, when people picture things to themselves, but also unconsciously, when the visual system tries to interpret a complex object such as a face, for instance? Expectations about where features of a face lie relative to one another, where shading is to be expected, and so on, could be fed back from higher-order visual memory to assist in recognition.
Ullman [12] and Mumford [13] have proposed computational models of this kind. Both envisage the feedback cortical pathways transmitting back patterns of activity that are compared with the incoming sensory data, and, by a search process [12] or response to an error signal [13] , arriving at the best match between an abstract representation in a higher area and the sensory data. The models differ, in that Ullman's makes a greater separation between forward and backward pathways, which are thought of as countercurrent streams, whereas Mumford's has a more local, interactive character. But they share the fundamental feature that they can be viewed as generative models, in the sense that they generate in a lower area, via the backward pathways, instances of the more abstract patterns in a higher area. The ancestry of generative models can be traced back at least forty years to ideas proposed by the psychologist Donald MacKay [14] , yet it is only recently that they have begun to be explored as computational models of the brain (see also [15] ).
These models formulate the way that imagery-as-expectation could operate during sensory processing. They also suggest how one might explain pure, eyes-closed visual imagery: feedback would generate pictorial representations of objects from higher-order abstractions, and allow geometrical questions to be asked about them, for example "can we carry a piano up the apartment stairs?" (to borrow an example of Mumford's). Here, the models would have to operate in a different mode, not attempting to match sensory data; indeed, as MacKay [14] pointed out, a mismatch signal could mark the distinction between imagery and a true percept, and save us from confusing imagination and reality.
Perhaps many readers of Current Biology will feel, as Galton's scientific colleagues evidently did, that there is not much resemblance between the sketchy phantoms of our imagination and reality. We can only envy those with the astonishing powers of visualization described in some of Galton's responses. Yet most of us have imagined moving a heavy piece of furniture round an awkward corner, and in doing so we have, perhaps, tapped into one of the secrets of brain function.
